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LAW, ORDER, AND THE CONSENT DEFENSE
KEITH M. HARRISON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the benefits that we gain on leaving the state of na-
ture and joining together in a "civilized society" is some amount of
added protection of our individual possessions and person. Among
our losses is the ability to plunder, at will, the possessions and bod-
ies of those who are weaker than we are. These two statements are
generally, but not absolutely, true. I propose that one hallmark of
civilization is the security of everyone who lives under its authority
that they are free from the unwanted interferences of others with
their personal integrity and property rights.' One way to gauge the
proximity of my two opening statements to absolute truth, and there-
by any society's proximity to absolute civilization, is to examine the
use of the consent defense in the criminal law. In this essay I will
give a framework for examining the consent defense for this purpose.
When we consider the consent defense, we typically think of
it as occupying the border between individual liberty and governmen-
tal control. In the customary way that the criminal law is discussed
and taught, as a control on individual conduct, this is a perfectly
©1993, Keith M. Harrison. No copyright is claimed to quoted materials from
other sotirces.
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver; B.A., Saint John's
College; J.D., University of Chicago.
1. This is hardly a new idea. For example, the proponents of the federal
Constitution recognized that:
In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite
and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a
state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the vio-
lence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the stronger individu-
als are prompted, by the uncertainty of their condition, to submit to a
government which may protect the weak as well as themselves; so, in the
former state, will the more powerful factions or parties be gradually in-
duced, by a like motive, to wish for a government which will protect all
parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful.
The Federalist 51, (Hamilton or Madison), in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 322, 326
(Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1894).
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acceptable way to think of the consent defense. However, the crimi-
nal law can also be used as a means of controlling and oppressing
groups. It is this type of control that makes a society more tribalistic
and less democratic. And it is this type of control that is revealed on
close examination of the consent defense.
I. HISTORICAL BASIS FOR THE CONSENT DEFENSE
Generally the consent of an individual victim of a crime will
not operate'as a defense to a criminal prosecution unless the lack of
the individual victim's willing, capable, and informed consent is an
element of the charged offense, such as in the crimes of rape2 or
larceny.3 This is so because under our traditional framework for
justifying the state's exclusive right to use force to punish criminal
wrongdoers, the state is always deemed to be the only legal victim
of a violation of the criminal law. The individual who was harmed
by the wrongdoer is at best a witness for the prosecution, albeit
usually a very important witness. When a wrongdoer is criminally
punished for stealing the private property of another individual, the
state is not exacting punishment because of any special affinity for
that individual property owner over other property owners. The state
exacts criminal punishment because the wrongdoer has threatened the
essential power of the state to define and guarantee property rights.
The state/victim and individual/witness distinction also serves to
2. See, e.g., State v. Moorman, 358 S.E.2d 502, 505 (N.C. 1987):
Mhe common law implied in the law the elements of force and
lack of consent so as to make the crime of rape complete upon the mere
showing of sexual intercourse with a person who is asleep, unconscious, or
otherwise incapacitated and therefore could not resist or give consent. Our
rape statutes essentially codify the common law of rape. In the case of a
sleeping, or similarly incapacitated, victim it makes no difference whether
the indictment alleges that the vaginal intercourse was by force and against
the victim's will or whether it alleges merely the vaginal intercouse with
an incapacitated victim. In such a case sexual intercouse with the victim is
ipso facto rape, because the force and lack of consent are implied in the
law.
3. See, e.g., State v. Byars, 550 So.2d 876, 879 (La. Ct. App.2d Cir.
1989):
The elements of theft have therefore been enumerated as follows:
(1) There must be a misappropriation or taking; (2) the object of tha mis-
appropriation or taking msut be a thing of value; (3) the thing must belong
to another; and (4) the misappropriation or taking must be with the intent
to deprive the owner permanently of the thing taken. We would add, in a
case of this sort, (5) the misappropriation or taking msut be without the
owner's consent, or by fraudulent conduct.
(Vol. 12:477
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explain the difference between the treatment of individual consent in
tort and criminal cases. In some instances the fact that an individual
has validly consented to some physical harm may operate as a de-
fense to a private action for damages while not having any legal
relevance in a criminal prosecution of the same defendant based on
the same conduct.'
In contrast to the crimes in which the state has to prove lack
of consent as an element of the offense stand those crimes for which
consent traditionally had been totally irrelevant. These have included.
homicide, carnal knowledge of someone underage,6 sodomy,7 and
adultery.' In these cases the law is said to "protect" those who can-
not, or choose not to, protect themselves.9
The general rule has always been that an individual's consent
will not relieve a wrongdoer of criminal liability for prohibited con-
duct." However, certain notable exceptions have developed over
time. While some of the original reasons for these exceptions have
either vanished or were questionable from their inception, the excep-
tions persist. As part of the general rule, assaultive behavior is crimi-
nal. However, exceptions are made at the lower end of assaultive
4. Most courts have held, when confronted with the issue, that consent is
no defense to an aggravated battery. See, e.g., Jaske v. State, 539 N.E.2d 14
(Ind. 1989). However, the Restatement (Second) of Torts illustrates the effective
use of the consent defense by describing a test of strength where one person
consents to let another punch him in the chest as hard as he can. The defendant
punches the victim in the chest and inadvertently kills him. In the illustration
given, the victim's consent would be sufficient to bar recovery for his death but
may not bar a criminal prosecution. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 892 a,
illustration 5 (1962).
5. One who commits manslaughter through the injection of narcotic drugs
into his or her victim may not rely on that victim's request to, or consent to,
administer the drugs as a defense. People v. Cruciani, 327 N.E.2d 803 (N.Y.
1975).
6. "The underlying premise of rape laws is the lack of the female's con-
sent to an invasion of her bodily privacy. The prohibition against sexual inter-
course with a female minor is an attempt to prevent the sexual exploitation of
persons deemed legally incapable of giving consent." State v. Stiffler, 763 P.2d
308 (Idaho 1988).
7. In those jurisdictions which criminalize consensual adult sodomy, consent
will only make both parties criminally liable. See e.g., Miller v. State, 268
N.E.2d 299 (Ind. 1971).
8. In jurisdictions in which adultery is a crime, the fact that those engag-
ing in adulterous sexual intercourse consent thereto is no defense. See e.g., Com-
monwealth v. Stowell, N.E.2d 357 (Mass. 1983).
9. "Whether or not the victims of crimes have so little regard for their
own safety as to request injury, the public has a stronger and overriding interest
in preventing and prohibiting acts such as these." State v. Fransua, 510 P.2d
106, 107 (N.M. Ct. App. 1973)).
10. See W. E. Shipley, Annotation, Consent as Defense to Change of Crim-
inal Assault and Battery, 58 A.L.R.3D 662 (1992).
1993]
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conduct in the nature of unwanted and unconsented-to touchings that
occur in the course of everyday life, such as the minor jostles that
are received while walking down a busy street, taking an elevator, or
riding in coach."
There have also long been exceptions to the general rule
concerning the availability of the consent defense for some conduct
that is substantially more dangerous than are everyday social encoun-
ters. Ordinarily an individual's consent to violent strikes and blows
capable of producing serious injury will not aid the attacker in a
criminal prosecution. 2 Yet, such strikes and blows are encountered
in the usual course of many common competitive athletic events.' 3
Such activity was condoned originally on the theory that the king (or
sovereign) might have a sudden need to raise an army of physically
fit and competitive-minded men to defend against an enemy inva-
sion. 4
In other cases of commonly consented-to violence to the
body, individuals are allowed to absolve health care providers of
criminal liability by giving consent to such sometimes fatal acts of
physical invasion as surgery.'5 The criminal law originally allowed
consent to operate in this area to improve the likelihood that the
individual would maintain the ability to contribute to society.' 6 Con-
11. Courts have traditionally held that accidents committed in the course of
non-criminal conduct cannot result in criminal convictions. See, e.g., Turner v.
State, 485 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972).
12. State v. Hatfield, 356 N.W.2d 872 (Neb. 1984).
13. According to some sources the cost of sports injuries in the United
States exceeds $40 billion annually, and some 900,000 high school students are
injured each year. Steven Greenhouse, The Big Bucks in Knees and Elbows N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 1983 at § 3, p. 1.
14. The common law recognizes as not unnecessarily unlawful certain manly
sports calculated to give bodily strengh, skill and activity, and "to fit people for
defense, public as well as personal, in time of need." Commonweatlh v. Collberg,
119 Mass. 350, 353 (1876).
15. In fact in some situations a doctor may even not be forced to advise a
patient of all possible, however improbable, consequences of a surgical procedure,
including death. See, e.g., Women's Medical Center of Providence, Inc. v. Rob-
erts, 530 F. Supp. 1136, 1151-1152 (D.R.I. 1982).
16. However the decision as to which surgical procedures should be allowed
to be consented to remains a matter of personal taste:
An ordinary surgical operation, which is done for the sake of a man's
health, with his consent, is, of course, perfectly lawful because there is just
cause for it. If, however, there is not just cause or excuse for an operation,
it is unlawful even though the man consents to it. The classic instance is a
case recorded by Lord Coke, tried at Leicester in 1604, when a "young
strong and lustie rogue, to make himself impotent", got his companion to
cut off his left hand so that he might avoid work and be able the better to
beg. Both were found guilty on indictment of criminal offense .... A
later instance can be given from early Victorian days when soldiers, as part
[Vol. 12:477
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versely, it has been held that consent would not justify intentional
bodily mutilation done with an eye toward increasing the injured
person's ability to beg for alms 7 or to avoid military service."8 In
any case - whether involving athletic violence, surgical procedures,
or other instances in which the consent defense is available - the
individual is allowed to act as a legislature of one on the theory that
the individual can adequately protect the interest that the law seeks
to safeguard.'
9
The traditional exceptions to the general non-availability of
the consent defense are capable of being divided into three broad,
and sometimes overlapping, categories: ownership, utility and pater-
nalism. If the early common law principles can be imagined as de-
veloped primarily to secure the place of the individual sovereign and
his or her peers in society, then those who were the intended sub-
jects of the law were allowed to consent to possible harm if doing
so furthered, or at least did not interfere with, the ownership, utility,
or paternal interests of those whom the law was designed to serve.
Although in the United States there is no individual sovereign and no
of their drill, had to bite cartridges. A soldier got a dentist to pull out his
front teeth so as to avoid the drill. In the opinion of Stephen, J., both
were guilty of a criminal ofense . . . . Another instance is an operation for
abortion, which is "unlawful" within the statute . . . unless it is necessary
to prevent serious injury to health. Likewide with a sterilization operation.
When it is done with the man's consent for a jsut cause, it is quite lawful,
as, for instance, when it is done to prevent the transmission an hereditary
disease; but when it is done without just cause or excuse, it is unlawful,
even though the man consents to it. Take a case where sterilization opera-
tion is done so as to enable a man to have the pleasure of sexual inter-
course without shouldering the responsibilities attaching to it. The operation
then is plainly injurious to the public interest. It is degrading to the man
himself. It is injurious to his wife and to any woman whom he marry, to
say nothing of the way it open to licentiousness; and, unlike contraceptives,
it allows no room for a change of mind on either side. It is illegal, even
though the man consents to it, . . .
Bravery v. Bravery, 3 Eng. Rep. 59, 67 (1954) (Denning, L.J., dissenting).
17. Wright's Case, (Leicester Assizes 1603) (cited in State v. Bass, 120
S.E.2d 580, 583 (N.C. 1961)).
18. SiR JAMES FrrZJAMEs STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
(1878) states:
It seems absurd to say that if A gets a dentist to pull out a front tooth of
A's because it is unsightly, though not diseased, A and the dentist both
commit a misdemeanor. When it was an essential part of a common
soldier's drill to bite cartridges, I believe that it was not an uncommon
military offense to get the font teeth pulled out, and this would, I presume,
be an offense at common law also.
19. In fact the model penal code absolves a criminal defendant of liability
if the victim's consent "precludes the infliction of harm or evil sought to be
prevented by the law defining the offense." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.11.
19931
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legally recognized class of nobility, the same framework can explain
the use of the consent defense today.
I. THE CURRENT DILEMMA
In recent articles, Professors Patrick Fitzgerald," Brenda M.
Baker,21 and Lucinda Vandervort have examined the apparent par-
adoxes of the consent defense in a criminal law designed for modem
democratic society, a society that has neither a true individual sov-
ereign nor any effective legal class of nobility.
Professor Fitzgerald would like to reconcile common intuition
with the common law principles of the consent defense and articulate
a general principle that would encompass all of the situations in
which one person consents to the invasion of bodily integrity by
another.' Concluding that such a reconciliation is unlikely, he re-
sorts to, in the admittedly "unlikeliest of places," English tax law for
an analogy and derives a set of "badges of 'acceptable' consensual
harms"'24 and a similar set of "badges of unacceptable consensual
harms."'  These "badges" are to serve as guideposts in determining
20. Patrick Fitzgerald, Consent, Crime and Rationality, in LEGAL THEORY
MEETS LEGAL PRACnCE, 209 (1988).
21. Brenda M. Baker, Consent, Assault and Sexual Assault, in LEGAL THEO-
RY MEETs LEGAL PRACTIcE, 223 (1988).
22. Lucinda Vandervort, Consent and the Criminal Law, 28 OSGOGDE HALL
L.J. 485 (1990).
23. Fitzgerald, supra note 21 at 209.
24. Fitzgerald further states:
One is that the harm is easily reversible - not that it has to be reversible,
but the more reversible it is, the less permanent the setback to what may
generally be thought to be the victim's interests. Another is that it is done
for the victims own greater physical or mental welfare - the case with
medical treatment and surgical operations, which injure the part for the sake
of the whole, with palliative care and arguably with mercy-killing, which
shortens the quantity of life for the sake of avoiding total deterioration in
its quality. Yet a third is that it is done for the good of others individually
or generally - the position with organ donation and scientific research.
Fitzgerald, supra note 21, at 220.
25.
Conversely badges of unacceptable consensual harms are irreversibility, lack
of connection with the victim's physical and mental health and failure to
contribute to the well-being of others. Such an approach might explain the
unacceptability of torturing a willing masochistic victim. For while the pain
of medical treatment may equal that of non-medical torture and while both
treatments may produce ends desired by the victim - freedom from illness
in the one case and freedom from psychological tension in the other - the
former provides a cure and so a more enduring liberation from the victim's




whether conduct that would ordinarily be criminal could be justified
or excused. Using this method of explaining and examining the con-
cept of consent as a defense to criminal prosecution, Fitzgerald
would like modem criminal law to accept mercy killing and assisted
suicide as the type of conduct capable of being defended in a crimi-
nal prosecution with evidence of victim consent.'
Professor Baker focuses our attention on consent in the areas
of intimate interpersonal relations, both those deemed by the law to
be acceptable (and hence legitimate sexual intercourse) and those
deemed by the law to be unacceptable (and hence sexual assault or
some other form of criminal sexual activity).27 She voices concern
over Australian reform efforts in the area of criminal sexual assault
laws, which, she maintains, tend to take the emphasis away from
lack of consent. Baker envisions problems both in the continued
criminalization of individually-desired violent sexual liaisons and the
continued non-criminalization of certain unwanted traditional sexual
relationships.'
Id.
26. Id. at 221.
27. I refer to both sexual intercourse and sexual assault as intimate interper-
sonal relations - not to indicate that I believe that the two concepts are general-
ly related in any way. While some writers may feel comfortable equating the
two, see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 1193, 1199 (1985) (" . . . the prohibition against rape is to the
marriage and sex 'market' as the prohibition against theft is to explicit markets
in goods and services."), I do not. However, I do so here because the law's
willingness, or unwillingness, to acknowledge, 'the power of an individual to
control private sexual relations determines whether individually desired sexual
relations are punished, while unwanted assaults on individual bodily integrity are
allowed to go unpunished.
28. Brenda Baker notes:
Undoubtedly, consent to certain forms of physical non-sexual contact is
quite reasonably taken to be implied in a variety of familiar circumstances,
just as there are general understandings that in some emergency situations
consent may be disregarded, or not secured, before acting. However, in the
case of contacts of a sexual character, inferences about implied consent
must be much more cautiously drawn. In many, perhaps most, situations,
implied absence of consent is the appropriate working assumption; only
within rather special contexts, typically marked by interpersonal intimacy or
familiarity, can the idea of implied consent to certain kinds of sexual ap-
proaches or familiarities be entertained.
[Riemoval of consent as an element in the more serious
sexual offences [such as where there is violence, physical force, or physical
injury] . . . may have unintended and undesirable consequences . . . [such
as] prohibiting the imposition of physical force or harm even where that
was fully consented to for mutual sexual arousal or satisfaction . . . . [It]
might also apply to cases of one partner infecting another with herpes or
AIDS even if the other willingly had intercourse knowing the risk . . .
Baker, supra note 26, at 229-230 (emphasis in original).
1993]
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Professor Vandervort believes that both Fitzgerald and
Baker's proposals to give added value to individual choice in this
area of the law can be attained only after great societal hurdles are
overcome, if at all.' She explains the traditional distinctions in the
availability of the consent defense in terms of "dominant social per-
ceptions and preferences."3 In fact, while Vandervort recognizes
that "it is always societal preference, not consent by the individual,
that determines whether a particular physical intervention with that
person is classified in law as an assault,"'" she, and most who have
commented on the subject, only hint at the true nature of these "so-
cietal preferences" and the role that they play in shaping a criminal
law for a free society.32 What Fitzgerald and Baker fail to account
for is the same thing that Vandervort only hints at. That is, despite
any stated principle that "it is ordinarily [the] individual who has the
right to determine what his or her own interests are and to have that
determination repsected by other persons,"33 the essence of the con-
sent defense is the allowance for the law to differentiate between the
same type of bodily intrusions as they occur to different types of
people.
I submit that the darker side of the consent defense, as it has
historically been allowed to be asserted by the courts and more re-
cently by the legislatures, does not lie in its effect on truly individu-
al, or more appropriately - idiosyncratic,' choices. By its very
nature, organized society and its criminal laws will always pose some
limits on all of its members' idiosyncratic choices - whether those
choices are manifested in such frivolous ways as the desire to drive
on the lefthand side of the road (in the United States and Canada) or
the much more serious decision to terminate a loved one's suffering
from an incapacitating and terminal illness by mercy killing or assist-
29. "To implement the Fitzgerald and Baker proposal in a manner that
actually enhances self-determination, and thus achieves the purported goal, poses a
greater challenge than is at first apparent." Vandervort, supra note 23, at 488.
30. Id. at 489.
31. Id. at 487.
32. Indeed Professor Vandervort states that the criminal law is committed
"primarily to the preservation of collective societal values as interpreted by the
legal system of the day." Id. at 493. However, while clearly implied, it is left
for the reader to infer how much, or how little, those collective societal values
have crushed the freedoms of individuals and groups.
33. Vandervort, supra note 23, at 488.
34. In using this term I do not wish to imply any psychological infirmity
or raise questions concerning the voluntary nature of the person's conduct. I want
only to designate the person's motivation as being derived from a private individ-
ualized, but not necessarily unique, assessment of needs, with no desire to yield
to the will of society. There may, in fact, be many like-minded individuals who
share the same idiosyncratic desires.
[Vol. 12:477
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ed suicide. As stated by Vandervort, when these idiosyncratic choices
"are not congruent with dominant social perceptions and preferences
[they] are routinely denied recognition by the criminal justice sys-
tem."'3 This is the essence of government, even democratic govern-
ment.
IV. THE DARK SIDE OF THE CONSENT DEFENSE
The dark side of the consent defense is manifested when,
acting as the individual sovereign and class of nobility did toward
their subjects, a socially dominant group uses the law to assert an
ownership, utility, or paternal interest over the self-determination in-
terests of identifiable and discernably less dominant groups.36 This
inhibits the ability of the less dominant group to vary from the pre-
cepts and traditions of the dominant social group based on the less
dominant group's assessment of its own needs, its own desires, and
the physical integrity of members of the less dominant group. The
less dominant group should then be considered oppressed by the
dominant group's use of the law.
The use of the law to oppress weaker social groups should be
distinguished from the law's inherent effect of controlling the con-
duct of individuals. In a particular jurisdiction, a medical doctor may
not be allowed to assert the defense of consent when charged with
assisting in a patient's suicide.37 This is because the doctor's, and
presumably the patient's, views on whether the sanctity of life should
outweigh the quality of that life are truly idiosyncratic. And these
views remain essentially idiosyncratic in nature, even if they are the
views held by a large number of diverse people. It is the determina-
tion of society that these views do not deserve the protection of the
law. Any person who acts at the request of someone pursuant to
35. Vandervort, supra note 23, at 489.
36. For ease of discussion, let us consider groups to be those classes of
people for whom there is ample evidence that the law has traditionally and open-
ly sought to discriminate against: racial, ethnic, and religious minorities, women,
the lower economic classes; and gays and lesbians.
37. See, e.g., PUBLIC ACrs OF MICHIGAN Section 7(1) Act 270, (1992)
(Michigan Commission on Death and Dying):
A person who has knowledge that another person intends to commit or
attempt to commit suicide and who intentionally does either of the follow-
ing is guilty of criminal assistance to suicide, a felony punishable by im-
prisonment for not more than four years or by a fine of not more than $
2,000.00, or both: (a) Provides the physical means by which the other
person attempts or commits suicide. (b) Participates in a physical act by
which the other person attempts or commits suicide.
1993]
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these views commits a crime." This use of the criminal law illus-
trates the never-to-be-resolved problem of truly individual free choice
in a democratic society. However, it does not threaten to undermine
the very foundation of democratic institutions. On the other hand, if
an individual's choices concerning self-determination are invalidated
- not because those choices are truly idiosyncratic, but rather be-
cause that individual is a member of a discernible and identifiable
group being oppressed by the traditions and wishes of another group
- then the criminal law is not being used to maintain order in a
society that values individual liberty, but rather to enforce a social
hierarchy among various groups.
The criminal law has been used to maintain peaceful co-exis-
tence among individuals, as well as to oppress less dominant groups.
To understand how the consent defense can illustrate these dual uses,
let us reformulate a rationale for explaining when the defense will be
available.
Vandervort states that "[i]f individual and conventional soci-
etal perceptions and preferences were the same, there would never be
a difference between what the individual considers to be criminal
assault and what society labels as a crime."" To graphically display
this perfect union of state and individual preferences, Vandervort
uses a horizontal line and designates all conduct above the line as
having both positive social value and individual consent and thus
legitimate behavior. All conduct below the line lacks individual con-
sent and has a negative social value and is therefore criminal."
As Vandervort demonstrates, problems arise when the
individual's decisions concerning personal physical integrity differ
from the mandates of the society. Vandervort states that "it is always
societal preference, not consent by the individual, that determines
whether a particular physical intervention with that person is classi-
fied in law as an assault."'" This point is demonstrated by bisecting
the horizontal line (which now only represents the continuum of
societal values) with a vertical line representing the continuum of
individual preferences.4 2
With individual and societal preferences out of step, those
bodily invasions to which the individual consents will be allowed
only if they happen to coincide with the type of invasions that soci-
ety condones. Those bodily invasions which the individual abhors
will be punished only if society deems them undesirable. The indi-
38. Id.
39. Vandervort, supra note 23, at 485.
40. Id. at 486, Figure one.
41. Id. at 487.
42. Id. at Figure Two.
[Vol. 12:477
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vidual who enjoys sado-masochistic sexual relations exposes any
partner to criminal prosecution despite the presence of consent. The
hypersensitive public transportation patron, who hopes to keep the
world at bay, finds no relief in the criminal law. While some may
not like it, there is nothing that can prevent society from shaping the
law in ways contrary to truly idiosyncratic spirits. The problems arise
in democratic institutions when the law is used to crush groups.43
Professor Vandervort writes: "Human beings, even when they
share the same general values, are not always in perfect agreement
about what is . . .the relative value of particular states of affairs in
the world."'  But what about when an identifiable and discernable
group disagrees with a more powerful group about values and partic-
ular states of affairs in the world, a situation that has occurred fre-
quently in our history. I maintain that the criminal law has been, and
to some degree continues to be, used as a means not only of pre-
serving "the King's peace,"' 5 but also as a tool to maintain an es-
tablished social hierarchy in which racial and religious minorities,
poor people, women, and homosexuals have usually been thwarted in
any attempt to participate as full members of society.
To demonstrate this theory I shall continue with the graphic
depiction suggested by Professor Vandervort. However, in my dia-
gram (Figure One), the horizontal axis represents desires of the dom-
inant group(s) exercising power in society at the time. The vertical
axis, instead of representing essentially idiosyncratic desires, repre-
sents desires of a discernable and identifiable group being oppressed
to some degree by the dominant group. The vertical axis is faint
because the extent to which it will have any effect on the legal
43.
Persons "wandering or strolling" from place to place have been extolled by
Walt Whitman and Vachel Lindsay (citation omitted). The qualification
"without any lawful purpose or object" may be a trap for innocent acts.
Persons "neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time
by frequenting ... places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served"
would literally embrace many members of golf clubs and city clubs.
Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the ordinance
poor people, noncomformists, dissenters, idlers - may be required to
comport themselves according to the lifestyle deemed appropriate by the
Jacksonville police and the courts .... It furnishes a convenient tool for
"harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials, against
particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure.'
Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 & 170 (1972).
44. Vandervort, supra note 23, at 486.
45. "All offenses are either against the King's peace, or his Crown and
Dignity; and are so laid in every indictment." BLACKSTONE's COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWs OF ENGLAND, Book One, Chapter, 7, Of the King's Prerogative 258.
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outcome of conduct that interferes with personal integrity will vary
from time to time and group to group, depending on the social and
legal status of the group represented by the vertical axis.46
What is depicted in Figure One on the following page is the
rule that I advance concerning the availability of the consent defense:
The consent of an individual victim can be relevant to the criminal
law only if recognizing it does not promote the self-determination of
a group over which the dominant group in society wishes to assert
some ownership, utility, or paternal interest. This rule is not in con-
flict with Vandervort's assertion that collective preference will control
individual preference when there is a conflict of interests. I maintain
merely that if there is a more primary conflict, that of group interest,
the dominant group will prevail. If there is no group conflict, there
remains the possibility of an idiosyncratic preference that conflicts
with society's mandates.
46. "Our interpretation of what constitutes abuse of an individual and of the
extent to which individual interests may best be served by their subordination to
collective ends is never impersonal, atemporal, ahistorical, or acultural."











































V. HOW THE OWNERSHIP INTEREST OF THE DOMINANT GROUP
DETERMINES THE AVAILABILITY OF THE CONSENT DEFENSE
The most blatant form of dominant group ownership in the
law is the enslavement of one group of people by another. Undoubt-
edly, those who are enslaved have preferences that are contradictory
to those who enslave. However, the preference axis of the enslaved
group is legally irrelevant, because they have "no rights which the
[enslavers are] bound to respect."'47
The historic and current ability of women to consent legally
or to withhold consent to sexual intercourse can be used to illustrate
47. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857).'
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how a dominant group uses the law to assert an ownership interest
in an oppressed group under conditions that do not reach the level of
legal slavery. Currently, a woman's free and intelligent consent to
sexual relations, or the lack of that consent, plays a major role in
determining whether the law will recognize the interference with her
bodily integrity as consensual sexual intercourse, based on her self-
determination of bodily integrity, or some form of sexual crime."
However, historically, if a woman were unmarried, her consent would
be irrelevant to a charge of fornication.49 The vertical axis of Figure
One would be non-existent in the law. In traditional legal terms this
might be explained as the law's desire to protect the woman's chas-
tity even when she, presumably incorrectly, had determined not to
protect it. However, it should more accurately be considered as the
ownership interest of the dominant social group (men) being asserted
in the law to prevent the owned members of the oppressed group
(women) from determining the course of their own bodily integrity.
Such an act of self-determination would threaten the ownership rights
of men, as a group, over women, as a group. A similar analysis can
be used to explain the unavailability of the consent defense in a trial
for adultery.
The result is even more stark and less explicable in the case
of the sexual assault of a woman by a man to whom she is married.
In that case, the woman's consent, or more importantly the lack of
her consent, was historically irrelevant to the law." Traditionally,
this legal indifference to a woman's desires concerning her own
physical integrity has been explained as some sort of social welfare
effort to preserve the marital relationship.5 It is more easily under-
48. The law of rape protects the female's freedom of choice and punishes
unwanted and coerced intimacy. The male who imposes himself upon the female
by force or compulsion obviously violates these interests. MODEL PENAL CODE §
213.1, comment 4.
49. by the nature of the offense the consent of both parties is necessary for
the crime of fornication. Nephew v. State, S.E. 930 (Ga. Ct. App. 1909).
50. A man could not even be found guilty of raping, or assaulting with
intent to rape, his estranged wife who had sued unsuccessfully for divorce.
Frazier v. State, 86 S.W. 754 (Tex. Ct. App. 1905).
51.
While the marital rape exemption has its roots in the historic subjugation
of women, the Courts traced the first explicit statement about rape in mar-
riage to Sir Matthew Hale, the Chief Justice of the Court of Kings Bench
from 1671-1675. On the impossibility of marital rape, he stated, "[Tihe
husband cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself upon his lawful
wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contrac the wife hath
given up herself in this kind unto her husband which she cannot retract."
Joyce McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and
the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEmiISM 207, 248 (1992).
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stood if the vertical axis of Figure One is erased and the activity,
forced sexual relations with one's wife, is viewed entirely on the
horizontal axis. It is legal because a socially dominant group (men)
is giving legal voice to its wishes without regard to the concerns of
an oppressed group (women). The law has also had a historic toler-
ance for a man who physically assaults his wife.52 Although, a man
may no longer physically abuse his wife, with or without her con-
sent, 3 under a legal right to discipline her, the law and law en-
forcement have not necessarily progressed at the same rate. The law
has given relevance to the preference axis of women who are mar-
ried. The practical ability of that axis to become more than 'a faint
shadow is largely in the hands of police departments, prosecutors,
and courts, which may still be influenced in certain localities by the
traditional concept of the marital relationship.'
Of course, gender is not the sole determining consideration of
one's place in society. Nor has it been the sole determining factor of
a woman's ability to consent to interferences with her body. An Afri-
can-American woman's refusal to consent to sexual intercourse was
legally irrelevant at the time when African-Americans were chattels
under the law.5 The race of the woman and her assailant would
52.
The common law did place a limitation on the right of a husband to disci-
pline his wife. In its wisdom, it gave a husband the right to beat his wife,
provided he used a switch no larger than his thumb. The wife was incapa-
ble of bringing suit or being sued without the joinder of her husband. Suit
between husband and wife was precluded by the joinder rule, which would
have required the husband to sue himself. In the late 1800's, states began
to enact Married Women's Acts, for the purpose of removing these disabili-
ties.
Guffy v. Guffy, 631 P.2d 646 (Kan. 1981).
53. State v. Brown, 364 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976).
54. See, e.g. ANTHONY V. BOUZA, THE POLICE MYsTIQUE, 206-207 (1990):
The police culture, still largely male and white, has traditionally been un-
comfortable with the notion of intruding into the family: "A man's home is
his castle"; "Don't come between a man and his woman"; "She probably
had it coming"; "They'll kiss and make up by morning, and then I'll be
the villain"; "She's not going to sign the complaint in court." These are
the attitudes that have helped shape policy.
55. The Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals did not address directly the
question whether a slave had any personal rights that could be violated by rape,
but the other slave state that debated this issue decided that no such rights exist-
ed. Mississippi and Missouri, for example, decided that the rape of a slave wom-
an was imply not a crime, even when committed by a slave. When it involved
the prosecution of black slaves for the rape of black slave women, Virginia,
unlike other states, did not declare that such rapes were not a crime. But no
declaration was necessary, because "[the] law simply did not criminalize the rape
of slave women." This is not to suggest that slave women in Virginia were
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dictate the legal outcome, or the practical possibility, of any criminal
prosecution. 6 If the victim was an African-American woman (a
member of an oppressed group), then the vertical axis was non-exis-
tent. If the woman was poor, had previously engaged in consensual
sexual intercourse with another man, or was a prostitute, then the
significance of her consent, while not legally irrelevant, would vary
from the non-consenting, unmarried, white virgin because of group
membership."
distinctly better off that slave women elsewhere. What is significant is that was
not one reported prosecution of a white man for the sexual assault of a black or
mulatto women in either colonial or anti-bellum Virginia. This fact provides one
of the most telling illustrations of black women's complete and utter
powerlessness before the criminal laws of Virginia.
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. and Anne F. Jacobs, The "Law Only as an Enemy":
The legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and Ante-Bellum
Criminal Laws of Virginia, N.C. L. REV., 969, 1056 (1992).
56.
[R]ape of black female slaves was . . . an institutionalized method of ter-
rorism which had as its goal the demoralization and dehumanization of
black women (citation omitted).
The history of sexual assault upon African-American women is
unparalleled. Because of her status as a slave, the enslaved woman could
not escape sexual assault, and because of her inability to obtain work other
than as a domestic after slavery, the newly freed slave could not escape
sexual assault either (citation omitted). Although "the rape of a white wom-
an by a slave (or a Black freeman) was a capital offense in virtually every
jurisdiction" (citation omitted), the female slave had no protection from
rape, regardless of who assaulted her (citation omitted). And "[w]hen Black
women were raped by white, males, they were being raped not as women
generally, but as Black women specifically" (citation omitted).
-Moreover, the female slave had no one to protect her from sexual
assault. During slavery, an African-American woman could not look to the
white woman for protection or sympathy (citation omitted). "Some [white]
mistresses responded to the distress of female slaves by persecuting and
tormenting them. Others encouraged the use of black women as sex objects
because it allowed them respite from unwanted sexual advances" (citation
omitted). For the African-American woman, the hope of a life free of sexu-
al assault was just .as bleak after slavery. As during slavery, the newly
freed slave received no protection or sympathy from the white female.
Indeed, some white women solicited African-American women to act as
mistresses for their husbands; they hoped to stifle competition from other
white women and thus save their marriages (citation omitted). Thus, even
to the white woman, the newly freed female slave was an object to be
used. The past differences between the status and treatment of
African-American women and white women are stark. However, the differ-
ences that existed in the past continue today.
Comment, We Are Not Sisters: African-American Women and the Freedom to
Associate and Disassociate, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1467, 1482-1483 (1992).
57. Slippery notions of the concept of "chastity" have led to a sliding scale
in judging the criminality of sexually assaulting women and girls. See generally,
Comment, Adolescence in Jeopardy: An Analysis of Texas' Promiscuity Defense
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The relative dominance of groups affects more than just the
ability of the oppressed group members to expect the withholding of
their consent to have legal significance. It also affects their ability to
obtain lawful consent from others, including dominant group mem-
bers, in areas of social relationships. The best example of this is the
historic anti-miscegenation laws. These laws were specifically de-
signed to preserve the white race's dominant position in society."
The effect of these laws was to take away the ability of a white per-
son (member of a dominant group) to consent to sexual relations
with a person who was a member of another racial group (member
of an oppressed group). In this regard at least, white people who de-
sired equal relations with non-whites had the ability to consent to
such relations placed on the legally insignificant vertical axis. The
situation was controlled by the horizontal axis of white racial su-
premacy. To recognize the oppressed group as social equals would
detract from the ownership interest asserted by the dominant group.
While anti-miscegenation laws are no longer constitutional, their su-
premacist effects are still manifested in the individual attitudes of
some judges 9 and disparate outcomes of sexual assault prosecu-
tions.'°
VI. HOW THE UTILITY INTEREST OF THE DOMINANT GROUP
DETERMINES THE AVAILABILITY OF THE CONSENT DEFENSE
Group oppression is manifested not only by the dominant
group's influence over the availability of the consent defense in cases
for Sexual Assault, 29 Hous. L. REv. 583 (1992).
58. "[T]he state court concluded that the State's legitimate purposes were 'to
preserve the racial integrity of its citizens,' and to prevent 'the corruption of the
blood,' 'a mongrel breed of citizens,' and 'the obliteration of racial pride,' obvi-
ously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy." Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967).
59. A Michigan state probate court judge publicly stated that he was op-
posed to authorizing abortions for minors who did not have parental consent.
However, he would authorize an abortion in the case of a white girl who had
been raped by a black man. In re Bourisseau, 480 N.W.2d 270 (Mich. 1992).
60. See, e.g. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON
MINoRITIEs, Vol. II at 165 (1991):
[W]here the victim of the crime is white and the perpetrator is black, re-
search has shown that prosecutors are more likely to upgrade the charges
brought. Black defendants, therefore face more serious charges, more vig-
orous prosecution, and more severe sentences than white offenders when the
victim is white. In rape cases, one study found that where the victims
knew the rapist, black defendants were nearly twice as likely to be incar-
cerated for raping white women as for raping black women (60% vs.
30.9%).
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involving sexual relations, but also in other more apparently benign
situations. If one person cuts deep into the flesh of another with a
sharp knife, the assailant is criminally liable in all jurisdictions for
what the Model Penal Code terms an "aggravated assault."'" Be-
cause of the serious nature of this conduct, the consent of the injured
individual to the cutting is irrelevant to the assailant's guilt. Howev-
er, if the person wielding the knife is a properly trained and duly
licensed physician acting within the norms of the medical profession,
the patient's consent provides the surgeon with a good defense to a
criminal prosecution. In certain instances - for example, when the
patient's life is in danger and consent cannot be obtained - the
physician can even proceed without consent.62 Even if the patient
dies in, or as a result of, surgery, a physician whose conduct con-
formed to the standard of care of the profession will not be subject
to criminal liability.
There are few criminal prosecutions of doctors for performing
generally accepted medical procedures on consenting patients. How-
ever, the traditional manner in which the consent defense is applied
would be consistent with the law's desire to seek the greater social
good of extending life and alleviating pain, a manifestation of a
utility interest. Therefore, an individual is allowed to consent to the
surgical removal of a malignancy because the benefit of a more
comfortable and longer life for the individual, as well as a more
productive and less dependent citizen, outweigh the harm that the
law seeks to avoid. Unquestionably, the possible harm resulting from
even a routine surgical procedure can be very great.63 Yet because
the law values life and health so highly, it is willing to allow the
individual to risk death to extend life or ease the burdens of illness.
This traditional justification for the availability of the consent
defense for medical treatments that extend life or alleviate pain fails
61. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1(2)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). "A
person is guilty of aggravated assault if he . . . attempts to cause or purposely
or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon."
62. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable if...
the actor is a doctor or other therapist or person assisting him at his direc-
tion and: (a) the force is used for the purpose of administering a recog-
nized form of treatment that the actor believes to be adapted to promoting
the physical or mental health of the patient; and (b) the treatment is ad-
ministered with the consent of the patient or ... the treatment is adminis-
tered in an emergency when the actor believes that no one competent to
consent can be consulted and that a reasonable person, wishing to safeguard
the welfare of the patient, would consent[]
63. See, e.g., William E. Brigman, Circumcision as Child Abuse: the Legal
and Constitutional Issues, 23 J. FAM. L. 337 (1984).
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to explain adequately those procedures which are not designed to
extend life or ease pain, including many forms of cosmetic surgery.
Undoubtedly some cosmetic surgery is performed to assist a
patient in the resumption of a normal life following a traumatic
event, such as a disfiguring accident. Other cosmetic surgery is per-
formed to assist those who were born with birth defects in leading
normal lives. In these cases, the traditional analysis maintains that the
individual's consent to the possible harm involved in a surgical pro-
cedure is a sufficient safeguard to the harm that the law seeks to
avoid (reckless mutilation or endangering life), when compared with
the probable beneficial result (individual comfort and productive
membership in society).
One class of medical procedures that have been performed
with little attention from the legal community is that type which is
done to achieve Western standards of beauty, such as the surgical
augmentation or reduction of the female breast. These are but two of
the many types of cosmetic procedures performed on a routine basis
in many hospitals. Examination of these procedures can dramatically
demonstrate the inadequacy of traditional analysis of the consent
defense to fully explain consent to medical treatment. What explana-
tion of the consent defense can the traditional analysis make of the
patient who consents to surgical alteration of his or her body, not
because of a traumatic episode, but because of a strong desire to
change his or her appearance? The law certainly does not justify
allowing such consent to fulfill a desire to let an individual rearrange
his or her physical appearance as the individual sees fit. If that were
the case, draft-age men would be allowed to give legal consent to
the amputation of body parts to avoid military service. The crafty
person would be allowed to consent to mutilation to beg more effec-
tively on the streets. At best the consent of a woman to breast en-
largement can be justified as appropriate for the patient's mental
health because of the inadequacies she feels regarding her body,
usually as a result of societal pressures.' 4 The more realistic expla-
64. Anne Bolin, Vandalized Vanity: Feminine Physiques Betrayed and Por-
trayed, in TATrOO, TORTURE, MUTILATION, AND ADORNMENT 82 (1992).
Women have come to be defined primarily in terms of allure and
adornment, highly visible displays, and demonstrations of men's sqccess.
Capitalism and beauty conspire as a system in which seasonal changes in
fashions as well as cycles in the female contour sell products. Women's
ambivalence about body concept is institutionalized as a mechanism in the
economics of beauty. Because women are valued for how they look, not
what they do, they are more affected by ephemeral attractiveness norms
than men. "When beauty images change, bodies are expected to change as
well, for nature cannot satisfy culture's ideal."
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nation can be found by recalling the relevancy of consent to cases
that involved an asserted ownership interest of one class of person
over another, such as the physical discipline that a husband could
legally exert over his wife under the old common law scheme.65
The wife's consent was irrelevant in most cases because, in the view
of the law, she was her husband's property.' As long as his actions
were not fatal, the husband did not fear criminal sanction for his
conduct.67
In modem times, men assert a group utility interest in the
bodies of women. The utility interest can lead to results that are just
as oppressive as those caused by an ownership interest. However, the
utility interest differs from the ownership interest. An ownership
interest results in total control over the oppressed group. A utility
interest, on the other hand, does not equal total control but is instead
an interest in what the oppressed group does to fulfill the wants of
the dominant group. Therefore, while the hallmark of an ownership
interest is a denial of the right of the oppressed group to control its
own integrity, the utility interest allows the oppressed group to con-
sent to harms to which others may not.
As an oppressed group, women are allowed to consent to
surgical procedures that are otherwise legally unjustifiable, if in so
consenting they are attempting to bring their bodies closer to the
male (dominant group) dictated norm of physical appearance. Similar
observations can be made concerning surgical procedures that are
designed to make other racial or ethnic group members' appearance
more caucasian and western European." In the early twentieth cen-
65.
The husband also (by the old law) might give his wife moderate correction.
For, as he is to answer for her misbehavior, the law thought it reasonable
to entrust him with this power of restraining her, domestic chastisement, in
the same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his servants or chil-
dren, for whom the master or parent is also liable in some cases to an-
swer.
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Book One, Chapter
15, Of Husband and Wife 432.
66. "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the
very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or
at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband . .. ."
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIEs ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, Book One, Chapter
15, Of Husband and Wife 430.
67. See generally, Michael Dowd, Dispelling the Myths about the "Battered
Woman's Defense:" Towards a New Understanding, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567
(1992).
68. Ronald S. Matsunaga, Westernization of the Asian Eyelid, ARCH,
OTOLARYNGOL. 111, 149-153 (1985).
There has been a substantial rise in interest for westernization of Asian
eyelids in the United States and other Western countries. This can be partly
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tury, there were numerous experiments conducted in an attempt to
cure the impotence of men with testicle transplants from donors who
were usually poor, minorities, or prison inmates.69 When such do-
nors were not readily available, animal donors were used.
In these types of cosmetic surgeries, the patient's consent
legalizes the physician's otherwise assaultive conduct. Therefore, the
vertical axis of Figure One has legal relevance. On the other hand,
those who consent to having themselves maimed to avoid military
service or to increase their ability as beggars will not be able to
relieve their assailants of criminal responsibility. The vertical axis
gauging their preferences is irrelevant.
The law allows healthy people to undergo the sometimes
untested methods of cosmetic surgery, such as the implantation of
silicone bags in the human body,7" and increase their earning capac-
ity by making themselves conform to dominant notions of personal
appearance. Yet beggars will not be allowed to have themselves
mutilated in the hopes of increasing their earning capacity. How can
the differences in these outcomes be explained using the traditional
analysis of the consent defense?
A more direct example of the dominant group exerting its
attributed to the influx of immigrant Asians who have been exposed to
Western culture and are desirous of emulating their Western counterparts.
Also, there has been an increased demand for westernizing the Asian eye-
lids, as reflected in the greater number of Western surgeons who have been
consulted to perform this operation.
69. Long before Hemingway told the world of how Jake Barnes' phallic
misfortune led him to try to re-capture his youth and vigor through other men,
scientists were attempting to rejuvenate the elderly and reinvigorate the impotent
with the testicles of younger men:
Voronoff thought at first of transplanting human testicles in cases of
testicular exhaustion due to age or deficiency, whether the latter were con-
genital or caused by some local change such as orchitis or sclerosis. But
human testicles are difficult to procure. People do not yet understand that
the loss of one testicle has no bad effects . . . . If this were generally
known, many young people might be willing to give one testicle for this
purpose.
Voronoff thought of the possibility of procuring 'testicles from crimi-
nals condemned to death, but he concluded that this too was impracticable.
He decided to try the testicles of anthropoid apes . . .
NORMAN HAiRE, REJUvENATION: THE WORK OF STEINACH, VORONOFF, AND OTH-
ERS at 171 (1925).
70. Only after over two million American women had undergone surgeries
involving silicone-filled breast implants did the Food and Drug Administration
call for a moratorium on the procedures to study the safety of the implants. Judy
Foreman, FDA Asks Moratorium on Breast Implants, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 7,
1992, at 1.
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utility interest is evident in professional boxing, as well as other
organized athletic events, especially those events which are financial-
ly lucrative for their organizers. The object of boxing is for each
competitor to inflict physical violence on the other.7' It has few of
the virtues typically associated with competitive athletics.7 ' This is
significant because, in addition to its potential service to the sover-
eign in training draft-age men, traditional theories of the consent
defense in organized athletic contests rely upon the virtues instilled
in young people as a justification for its continued use. Yet, de-
spite the fact that most major medical authorities have called for a
ban of boxing events because of health risks,74 boxers will continue
to be allowed to beat each other senseless because of the monetary
(utility) interest of those who profit from their consented-to suffer-
ing.75
VII. How THE PATERNAL INTEREST OF THE DOMINANT GROUP
DETERMINES THE AVAILABILITY OF THE CONSENT DEFENSE
In addition to asserting .both ownership and utility interests,
socially dominant groups tend to affect the criminal law with a pater-
nal interest. As this interest is used to affect the rights of individuals,
while not without controversy, there is at least a general acknowl-
edgement of the appropriateness of paternalism on the part of the
71. However, the evils of dominant group interest are not limited to boxing
or to professional athletics. One head coach of a college football team was re-
cently fired when players complained that he forced them to practice beyond the
maximum time allowed under NCAA rules, punched them in unprotected areas of
their bodies with a clenched fist, and ordered them to take painkillers and avoid
classes that conflicted with their availability to play football. See Colorado Slate
Lists Charges Against Bruce, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1992, at B23.
72. In advocating a ban of boxing, editors of The New Republic found sup-
port in their position in noting that: "Of all professional athletes, none are less
worthy of emulation than boxers. Boxers get rich without an education. They
achieve status through violence. Their victories involve no teamwork. And they
indulge in ritual self-promotion." Ban Boxing, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 8, 1988,
at 7.
73. In most athletic contests, a participant who launches a violent attack on
another player has gone beyond the rules of the sport, as well as committed a
crime. State v. Floyd, 466 N.W.2d 919 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).
74. The American, British, Canadian, and Australian national medical soci-
eties have all urged that boxing be abolished. See George D. Lundberg, M.D.,
Boxing Should Be Banned in Civilized Countries - Round 3, 255 JAMA 2483
(1986).
75. "When you see guys like Trump, Kennedy, and Rockefeller -
bluebloods - when they come to a fight, regardless of what they may represent,
they come to see someone get hurt, and my objective is to inflict as much pun-
ishment [on my opponent] as possible." Mike Tyson, quoted in, Ban Boxing, THE
NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 8, 1988, at 7.
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state. For example, only a few would argue that the state should be
without power over those who practice medicine or dentistry without
some form of training and licensure. However, in the case of inter-
group relations, I propose that paternalism is something that lacks the
benign characteristics that may be seen in the regulation of individual
conduct.
In inter-group relations the dominant group seeks to perpetu-
ate its norms of behavior through its paternal interest by allowing an
individual to consent to what would otherwise be a criminal assault.
This is frequently accompanied by denying the use of consent as a
defense to similar assaultive conduct, which perpetuates a less domi-
nant group's culture. A good example of a dominant group's paternal
interest affecting the law is the law's continued tolerance for the
practice of circumcision. In the vast majority of cases, circumcision
is a procedure with debatable, if any, medical benefit.76 The most
likely reason for its continued practice is its significance in religious
culture.7' Even though it is a surgical procedure, bris milah, the
76. See, e.g., (Edgar J. Schoen, MD, Chairman, et al,) American Academy
of Pediatrics Task Force on Circumcision, Report of The Task Force on Circum-
cision, 84 PEDIATRICS 388 (1989):
Properly performed newborn circumcision prevents phimosis, paraphimosis,
and balanoposthitis and has been shown to decrease the incidence of cancer
of the penis among United States men. It may result in a decreased inci-
dence of urinary tract infection. However, in the absence of well-designed
prospective studies, conclusions regarding the relationship of urinary tract
infection to circumcision are tentative. An increased incidence of cancer of
the cervix has been found in sexual partners of uncircumcised men infected
with human papillomavirus. Evidence concerning the association of sexually
transmitted diseases and circumcision is conflicting.
Newborn circumcision is a rapid and generally safe procedure when
performed by an experienced operator. It is an elective procedure to be
performed only if an infant is stable and healthy. Infants respond to the
procedure with transient behavioral and physiologic changes.
Local anesthesia (dorsal penile nerve block) may reduce the ob-
served physiologic response to newborn circumcision. It also has its own
inherent risks. However, reports of extensive experience or follow-up with
the technique in newborns are lacking.
Newborn circumcision has potential medical benefits and advantages
as well as disadvantages and risks. When circumcision is being considered,
the benefits and risks should be explained to the parents and informed
consent obtained.
Id.
But see, Norma Fakjian, M.D., et al, An Argument for Circumcision; Prevention
of Balanitis in the Adult, 26 ARCH. DERMATOL. 1046-1047 (1990). ('Those who
forgo circumcision in the neonatal period appear to be inclined to develop in-
flammatory diseases of the foreskin in adulthood. Uncircumcised diabetic males
may be particularly predisposed to develop balanitis.")
77.
This is the bris milah (circumcision), which has been the practice of our
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Hebrew term for the religious circumcision, is not necessarily con-
ducted by a physician but a mohel, who may by coincidence be a
physician.78 Despite the controversy concerning its health aspects no
one has suggested that circumcisions be criminalized.79 However, the
legislatures of Idaho" and Illinois8 have enacted statutes that make
criminal the mutilation of a child during religious ceremonies. Yet
people for 4,000 years. This is a precept so ancient and so ingrained in the
subconscious of our nation that, until recently, it would have been unthink-
able to omit a properly performed bris to initiate a male Jewish infant into
the Covenant of Abraham.
HENRY C. ROMBERG, M.D., BRis MILAH 18 (1982).
78. However, there are some mohelim who believe that physicians should
not be admitted to their ranks. "One mohel after another . . . had a kabolleh
foon taten, a tradition from his father, not to teach milah to a physician." Id., at
25. And some believe that a mohel usually performs the procedure with more
skill than a physician. "[T]he traditional mohel performs a circumcision far more
skillfully, far less traumatically, far more safely, and certainly far more aestheti-
cally . . . than the average medical house officer who is assigned to circumcise
newborn babies." Id. at-27.
79.
The opinion of the medical profession is divided over the whole topic of
circumcision. One group feels quite strongly that routine circumcision for
all males is a good prophylactic health measure; the other group maintains
with equal vigor that it is unnecessary, possibly dangerous, cosmetic surgery
not accompanied by any proven or tangible benefit. Both sides concede,
however, that as an ancient Jewish religious ritual, it need not be inter-
fered with. That is stated plainly even by those who are most opposed to
routine circumcision.
Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
80. The Idaho code provides:
A person is guilty of a felony when he commits any of the following acts
with, upon, or in the presence of a child as part of a ceremony, rite or
any similar observance:
. . . mutilates . . . any . . . human being;
The provisions of this section shall not be construed to apply to:
The lawful medical practice of circumcision or any ceremony relat-
ed thereto . . .
Idaho Code § 18-1506A (1992).
81. Illinois provides that:
A person commits the offense of ritual mutilation, when he mutilates . . .
another person as part of a ceremony, rite, initiation, observance, perfor-
mance or practice, and the victim did not consent or under such circum-
stances that the defendant knew or should have known that the victim was
unable to render effective consent.
The offense ritual mutilation does not include the practice of cir-
cumcision or a ceremony, rite, initiation, observance, or performance related
thereto.
I11. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, para. 12-32 (1992).
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these laws specifically exempt circumcision from their definitions of
ritualized abuse. Is this because the legislatures of these states made
a finding that tattooing the numbers 666 on the scalp of a child is
more abusive than is cutting the foreskin away from an infant's penis
and sucking the blood from the wound?8" Probably not. It is more
likely that the Judeo-Christian culture, which recognizes circumcision
as an accepted and harmless religious practice, has little trouble
viewing other types of bodily mutilations done in connection with
worship as ritual abuse. While the legislatures of these states could
apparently enact laws that criminalize circumcision under any circum-
stance, that is unlikely.
An example of paternal interests affecting the availability of
the consent defense in a non-religious context is exemplified by the
fact that many jurisdictions allow individuals to consent to
tatooing." Without individual consent, tattooing would clearly con-
stitute a mutilation of the victim" of such seriousness that its use
has been outlawed as a form of cruel punishment. Even though
the practice of tattooing was apparently acquired by caucasian sailors
from Tahiti,86 it has currently gained widespread acceptance in many
parts of American culture. Yet it is doubtful that the same jurisdic-
tions that allow tattoo parlors to flourish would tolerate similar estab-
lishments dedicated to the provision of decorative body scars to those
who were willing to pay for them.87
82. Dr. Romberg explains:
The traditional practice of metzitzah b'peh [literally, withdrawal of the
blood by mouth], which has its roots in the earliest history of the Jewish
people and has survived unchanged to the present time, should be viewed
with great respect. It is spoken of very positively in the Jewish literature
on circumcision both as an essential part of the ritual and as a health
measure which prevents infection and promotes healing. Although there are
certain circumstances where a glass tube may be used, most Jewish sages
speak strongly in favor of (and some insist on) metzitzah b'peh without
additional instrumentation.
Romberg, supra note 78 at 57.
83. In fact, some jurisdictions permit the tattooing of minors so long as the
consent of their parent or guardian has been obtained. See, e.g., ARK, CODE
ANN. § 5-27-228 (1992); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 211.760 (Baldwin 1992); and
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS, § 26-10-19 (1992).
84. Tattooing is commonly considered self-mutilation by many prison au-
thorities. See e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1322 (5th Cir. 1974), Meyers
v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296, 312 (3d Cir. 1974), Martin v. Foti, 561 F. Supp.
252, 268 (E.D. La. 1983) and Taylor v. Perini, 413 F. Supp. 189, 226 (N.D.
Ohio 1976).
85. The Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 55, prohibits
"[p]unishment by flogging, or by branding, marking, or tattooing on the body, or
any other cruel or unusual punishment . . . " 10 U.S.C. § 855 (1956).
86. SHARON ROMM, M.D., THE CHANGING FACE OF BEAuTY 234 (1992).
87. Some cultures view the acquisition of such scars in the same way that
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By this point it is probably apparent that, as I stated at the
outset, the three broad categories that I have identified often overlap.
For example, the anti-miscegenation laws, which I attributed to the
dominant group's ownership interest, could also be categorized as a
paternal interest. The utility interest evidenced in professional and
intercollegiate athletics could be seen as a sign of an ownership
interest.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It has been my purpose to demonstrate that there is a unify-
ing principle in the law regarding the use of the consent defense in
the criminal law. That principle is not one that the law will over-
come any sooner than the underlying societal relationships that shape
the law will disappear.
To the extent that we value personal liberty and autonomy in
our society, our laws must at some point yield to the individual's
choice and decision concerning bodily integrity. If our courts and
legislatures decide that certain idiosyncratic preferences are too far
beyond the bounds of desirable or acceptable conduct, the law will
be used to enforce societal opinion and criminalize conduct associat-
ed with those individual preferences. In an ideal society, this legal
restriction would never yield different results based on the group
membership of the individual.8 However, until our society is much
closer to the ideal than it currently is, our laws can be expected to
yield such different results. Therefore, Professor Baker's earnest
desire that the criminal law be used to impose sanctions always and
only on the basis of the participants' consent to a sexual encounter
will not be achieved until the ownership, utility, and paternalistic
interests of dominant groups play no role in sexual mores. Likewise,
many Americans think of tattoos. See, e.g., Id. at 243:
"Many African tribes, adhering to a tradition that dates to prehistory, adorn
their bodies with scars. Scars in undulating stripes and patterns are placed
for psychological and social identification. They announce group member-
ship, proclaim the arrival of adulthood, and tell the world that the bearer is
beautiful." And there is some evidence that there might be at least limited
demand for such services in this country.
88. As Justice Black stated:
Today, as in ages past, we are not without tragic proof that the exalted
power of some governments to punish manufactured crime dictatorially is
the handmaid of tyranny. Under our constitutional system, courts stand
against any winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might oth-
erwise suffer because they are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they
are non-conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement.
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
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Professor Fitzgerald's hopes to legalize mercy killing must find a law
devoid of such interests in human life. It may be difficult for many
to acknowledge that the criminal law is little more than a tool to
enforce the will of the dominant social group. However, failure to
accept this in the area of the consent defense in criminal law will
leave us with a rule that is more appropriate to Alice in Wonderland
than to a predictable set of criminal laws: The consent defense may
be used when "we" say it may and it may not be used when "we"
say it may not.

